Show Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is a book nominally about, well, war. It’s kind of deceptively titled though. A more accurate title would be “The Art of Not Going to War Unless You Really Can’t Avoid It And Then Still Avoiding Fighting as Much as Possible.” That’s a bit of a mouthful, so probably best to stick the original, but you get the point. The Art of War applies to competition and conflict in general, on every level from the interpersonal to the international. Its aim is invincibility, victory without battle, and unassailable strength through understanding the physics, politics, and psychology of conflict. Though it can be abused, war is a helpful metaphor to think about conflict because the stakes for being right are really high. Your company being outcompeted by a competitor stinks, but your country being invaded and decimated and many people dying is like way, way worse so there’s a big incentive to get the strategy right. The central metaphor of Sun Tzu’s work is water.
Genius, in Sun Tzu’s explanation, is to behave like water. Water is strong offensively and defensively. If you are standing in the ocean as the waves come at you, punching or pushing at the wave is a strictly futile effort, the water simply redirects around you to the points where you are weak. You can neither strike it offensively nor resist it defensively. It flows away from where you are strong to wherever you are weak.
Water is at once full of power and empty of form, impossible to attack and impossible to resist. That seems pretty powerful. This metaphor has been echoed by many other strategists. Bruce Lee when talking about his fighting style famously said:
This is a pretty cool thing to think about but it’s not intuitively obvious to me how I would operate differently in my life or business or investments by “becoming like water.” As I was reading through The Art of War, I thought of the work of John Boyd, another military strategist most famous for his idea of the OODA Loop. OODA is an acronym standing for:
The OODA loop is often seen as a decision making model, but can be more accurately described as a model of individual and organizational learning and adaptation. It is a model for strategy. Boyd’s primary focus of study for strategy was the German Blitzkrieg. Before the Second World War, German generals had gone back and studied earlier military strategists and designed the blitzkrieg style to emulate the maneuver warfare styles of Sun Tzu and Genghis Khan rather than the attrition style of World War I. World War I had been a long, protracted series of trench warfare. It was less like flowing water and more like banging stones. The Blitzkrieg strategy employed by the Germans was much more fluid. There were three central concepts to the Blitzkrieg that Boyd studied: Schwerpunkt, Einheit and Fingerspitzengefühl. Schwerpunkt literally translates as center of gravity or emphasis, In military terms, it is usually the geographic point of attack. In non-military terms, it is probably best understood as focus or the main priority. Having a clear focus, and emphasizing that over any particular tactic, empowers those around you to make decisions for themselves instead of having to run everything by you. Famously, Facebook kept the number of users on huge TV screens around their office for many years. Everyone knew that when they were faced with a decision, they should make whatever decision caused that number to go up. Einheit translates to something like “mutual trust.” The German Blitzkrieg commander Heinz Gaedcke explained that one of the essential reasons for the success of the Blitzkrieg was that the German commanders all trusted each other implicitly. They had a relationship where they could look at each other in the eye and know exactly what needed to be done without speaking. Fingerspitzengefuhl translates literally as a fingertip feeling, but is most easily understood as intuitive skill or intuitive knowledge. A good military commander that has trained well can pattern match in real time which looks to others like an intuitive feeling for how to manage the battle. The German tank commanders could see where the enemy was weak and know to focus their efforts there. Similarly, good business leaders are able to draw on their experience to know where to focus their effort and resources. If you have all three of these together, it looks like very much like flowing like water. During the German blitzkrieg (which reached Paris in an astoundingly short time), you had all these factors operating together. Your commanders have fingerspitzengefuhl, a fingertip feeling, which allows them to sense where a weak point is in the enemy lines pops up. This weak point becomes the schwerpunkt, or center of focus for the German troops. Other troops quickly flow to this weak point because they trust their fellow soldiers (einheit). This lets them break through the enemy lines, forcing the enemy to retreat and regroup. If you were to look at how these troop movements behaved from a top-down view, it would look a lot like flowing water. Little droplets (small groups of troops) probe each point of the enemy’s lines. When they start to sense a weak point and a small breakthrough happens, water (troops) from elsewhere flow downhill towards the weak point. This causes it to weaken further. Eventually, they fully breakthrough and the rest of the troops flow through the wide hold in the enemy’s lines. Then the enemy retreats to try and form a new line and the same process repeats. Little probes eventually find a weak point and the rest of the forces flow through. The troops are flowing like water, moving through the enemy lines at the point of least resistance. From the enemy’s perspective, it is like trying to fight with the ocean. Wherever they strike, you fade away, flowing towards the point of least resistance. Sun Tzu talks about this in terms of emptiness and fullness. Where they strike, you are empty. But, where you strike, there is fullness that “punches” through. The outcome of this flowing like water is momentum. When you flow like water, you are going where the momentum takes you and so you have the momentum behind you. Having spent a decade advising and working with hundreds of companies across many different industries, I would say there is basically nothing more important to a company’s success than momentum. When an army has the force of momentum, even the timid become brave; when it loses the force of momentum, even the brave become timid. When a company has momentum, it seems like everyone is good at their job. Getting in a habit of winning consistently and following momentum is incredibly valuable. One way to lose momentum is to try and do too much. Often projects get scoped too big and drag on for too long, losing momentum. When you do battle, even if you are winning, if you
continue for a long time it will dull your forces and blunt your edge; if you besiege a citadel, your strength will be exhausted. If you keep your armies out in the field for a long time, your supplies will be insufficient. Good managers and companies don’t let projects drag on. They seize momentum and ship quickly. Good companies also cut their losses quickly. If you start an initiative and it doesn’t get momentum fast, get rid of it. When your forces are dulled, your edge is blunted, your strength is exhausted, and your supplies are gone, then others will take advantage of your debility and rise up. Then even if you have wise advisers you cannot make things turn out well in the end. Therefore I have heard of military operations that were clumsy but swift, but I have never seen one that was skillful and lasted a long time. Speed and momentum are the killer forces in all competitive environments and the notion to “become like water” is about how to get those on your side. In his 2016 letter to shareholders, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos gave similar advice:
In Sun Tzu’s terms, seizing the momentum is more important than being right. If you are wrong, you simply stop that direction and flow towards wherever the weakness is. Water doesn’t know the exact path it will take, it just worries about flowing downhill. Boyd also focused on the idea of momentum, Getting inside your adversary’s OODA loop is done by executing what he called “fast transients,” WTF moments designed to make your adversary feel trapped in an unpredictable world of doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, and chaos. The “transient” is the change between maneuvers. The ideal fast transient is an abrupt, unexpected, disorienting change that causes the other side to say “What the f**k!” Boyd was a renowned dogfighter because he would create disorienting, WTF moments by engaging in an unexpected maneuver and by the time the other pilot was able to re-orient, it was too late. Similarly, good leaders seize momentum. When they see an unexpected source of momentum, they don’t think “that’s not in the plan,” they think “this is the new plan.” One of the most useful questions I ask myself as part of my weekly review is “What were the 3 biggest wins or unexpected sources of momentum and how can I double down on them.” This is basically the idea of flowing to the point of least resistance, being like water. I think businesses can copy this idea of being like water by employing Boyd’s ideas of schwerpunkt, fingerspitzengefuhl, and einheit. Indeed, these are the core jobs of a good leader. The leader looks for the most important focus for the company (schwerpunkt) using their intuitive feeling for the market (fingerspitzengefuhl) and then build a culture of mutual trust (einheit) that enables everyone to work in sync. The leader also knows when to defer to the fingerspitzengefuhl of their team and let them be the ones that run with something when they have a better fingertip feeling rather than trying to micromanage. Sun Tzus message is clear: Become like water my friend. My Art of War Highlights and Notes(*CAO CAO, MENG SHI, MEI YAOCHEN, WANG XI, LI QUAN, MEI YAOCHEN, MASTER SUN, ZHANG YU, DU MU are all names of commentators adding their own interpretation of the book.) The Art of War applies to competition and conflict in general, on every level from the interpersonal to the international. Its aim is invincibility, victory without battle, and unassailable strength through understanding the physics, politics, and psychology of conflict. The physician, whose reputation was such that his name became synonymous with medical science in China, replied, “My eldest brother sees the spirit of sickness and removes it before it takes shape, so his name does not get out
of the house.” “My elder brother cures sickness when it is still extremely minute, so his name does not get out of the neighborhood.” “As for me, I puncture veins, prescribe potions, and massage skin, so from time to time my name gets out and is heard among the lords. Plan for what is difficult while it is easy, do what is great while it is small. The most difficult things in the world must be done while they are still easy, the greatest things in the world must be done while they are still small. For this reason, sages never do what is great, and this is why they can achieve that greatness. The master warrior is likewise the one who knows the psychology and mechanics of conflict so intimately that every move of an opponent is seen through at once, and one who is able to act in precise accord with situations, riding on
their natural patterns with a minimum of effort. The Art of War pinpoints anger and greed as fundamental causes of defeat. According to Sun Tzu, it is the unemotional, reserved, calm, detached warrior who wins, not the hothead seeking vengeance and not the ambitious seeker of fortune. The Tao-te Ching says:
“Those who are good at knighthood are not militaristic, those who are good at battle do not become angry, those who are good at prevailing over opponents do not get involved.”
This is a matter of emptiness and
fullness. When there are rifts between superiors and subordinates, when generals and officers are disaffected with each other, and dissatisfaction has built up in the minds of the troops, this is called emptiness. When the civilian leadership is intelligent and the military leadership is good, when superiors and subordinates are of like mind, and will and energy operate together, this is called fullness. When welfare and justice embrace the whole people, when public works are sufficient to meet national emergencies, when the policy of selection for office is satisfactory to the intelligent, when planning is sufficient to know strengths and weaknesses, that is the basis of certain victory. In Taoist thought, power was moral as well as material, and it was believed that moral power manifested itself both as self-mastery and as influence over others. To explain the strength of a national defense force, Zhuge writes: This in turn depends on the generals entrusted with military leadership. A general that is not popular is not a help to the nation, not a leader of the army. Zhuge emphasizes the
advantages of unexpectedness and speed, capable of reversing otherwise insurmountable odds: Planning should be secret, attack should be swift. When an army takes its objective like a hawk striking its prey, and battles like a river broken through a dam, its opponents will scatter before the army tires. This is the use of the momentum of an army. The simultaneous appreciation of very different points of
view is a powerful Taoist technique, whose understanding can resolve contradiction and paradox. The model of the paradox of The Art of War can be seen in the Tao-te Ching, where both ruthlessness and kindness are part of the Way of the sage. “Heaven and earth are not humanistic—they regard myriad beings as straw dogs; sages are not humanistic—they regard people as straw dogs,” wrote the philosopher of the Tao-te Ching. A horrified Western Sinologist working in the 1950s, shortly after the truce
in Korea, wrote that this passage had “unleashed a monster,” but to a Taoist this statement does not represent inhumanity but an exercise in objectivity, similar to Buddhist exercises in impersonality. Certain Taoists regard the Tao-te Ching to be a transmission of ancient lore compiled and elaborated by its “author,” rather than a completely original
work, and the same may very well be true of The Art of War. The Art of War brings up five things that are to be assessed before undertaking any action: the Way, the weather, the terrain, the military leadership, and discipline. In this context, the Way (Tao) has to do with civil leadership, or rather the relationship between political leadership and the populace. In both Taoist and Confucian parlance, a
righteous government is described as “imbued with the Tao,” and Sun Tzu the martialist similarly speaks of the Way as “inducing the people to have the same aim as the leadership.” The opening statement of The Art of War introduces the three main facets of the warrior’s art: the social, the psychological, and the physical. Considerable attention is devoted to the importance of conservation of energy and material resources. When victory is won, Sun stresses that it should be complete, to avoid the expense of maintaining an occupation force. The topic of the fifth chapter of The Art of War is force, or momentum, the dynamic structure of a group in action. Here Master Sun emphasizes organizational skills, coordination, and the use of both orthodox and guerrilla methods of war. He stresses change and surprise, employing endless variations of tactics,
using opponents’ psychological conditions to maneuver them into vulnerable positions. The essence of Sun Tzu’s teaching on force is unity and coherence in an organization, using the force of momentum rather than relying on individual qualities and talents: “Good warriors seek effectiveness in battle from the force of
momentum, not from individual people.” Conserving one’s own energy while inducing others to dissipate theirs is another function of the inscrutability so highly
prized by the Taoist warrior: “The consummation of forming an army is to arrive at formlessness,” says Master Sun, for then no one can formulate a strategy against you. At the same time, he says, induce opponents to construct their own formations, get them to spread themselves thin; test opponents to gauge their resources and reactions but remain unknown yourself. In this case, formlessness and fluidity are not merely means of defense and surprise, but means of preserving dynamic potential,
energy that could easily be lost by trying to hold on to a specific position or formation. Master Sun likens a successful force to water, which has no constant form but, as the Tao-te Ching notes, prevails over everything in spite of its apparent weakness: Sun says, “A military force has no constant formation, water has no constant shape. The ability to gain victory by changing and adapting according to the opponent is called genius.”
Yinyang principles on which they are based, that of reversion from one to the other at the
extremes.
The I Ching says, “The sovereign uses three chasers, letting the game ahead escape,” and “if you are too adamant, action is unlucky, even if you are right.”
Note: Always move just one step away, enlarge your circle of competence but slowly. Although Master Sun never dismisses the weight of sheer numbers or material might, here as elsewhere there is the strong suggestion that social and psychological factors can overcome the sort of power that can be physically quantified: “In military matters it is not necessarily beneficial to have more, only to avoid acting aggressively; it is enough to consolidate your power, assess opponents, and win people, that is all.”
Note: Don’t compete out of jealousy or anger, do so when advantageous. The Art of War was evidently written during the so-called Warring States period of ancient China, which lasted from the fifth to the third century B.C.E. Master Sun
has his readers dwell on the ravages of war, from its incipient phases of treachery and alienation to its extreme forms of incendiary attack and siege, viewed as a sort of mass cannibalism of human and natural resources. With this device, he gives the reader an enhanced feeling for the significance of individual and social virtues espoused by the humanitarian pacifists. From this point of view, it is natural to think of the Taoist thread in The Art of War not as a random cultural element, but as
key to understanding the text at all of its levels. By the nature of its overt subject matter, The Art of War commanded the attention of people who were less likely to pay serious mind to the pacifistic teachings of the classical humanists. The five things are the way, the weather, the terrain, the leadership, and
discipline. The Way means inducing the people to have the same aim as the leadership, so that they will share death and share life, without fear of danger. Leadership is a matter of intelligence, trustworthiness, humaneness, courage, and sternness. Reliance on intelligence alone results in rebelliousness. Exercise of humaneness alone results in weakness. Fixation on trust results in folly. Dependence on the strength of courage results in violence. Excessive sternness of command results in cruelty. When one has all five virtues together, each appropriate to its function, then one can be a military leader. Discipline means organization, chain of command, and
logistics. Structure depends on strategy; strategy is determined according to events. When they are fulfilled, be prepared against them; when they are strong, avoid them. Use anger to throw them into disarray. Use humility to make them haughty. Tire them by flight. Cause division among them. The one who figures on victory at headquarters before even doing battle is the one who has the most strategic factors on his side. When you do battle, even if you are winning, if you continue for a long time
it will dull your forces and blunt your edge; if you besiege a citadel, your strength will be exhausted. If you keep your armies out in the field for a long time, your supplies will be insufficient. When your forces are dulled, your edge is blunted, your strength is exhausted, and your supplies are gone, then others will
take advantage of your debility and rise up. Then even if you have wise advisers you cannot make things turn out well in the end. Therefore I have heard of military operations that were clumsy but swift, but I have never seen one that was skillful and lasted a long time. Those
who use the military skillfully do not raise troops twice and do not provide food three times. When a country is impoverished by military operations, it is because of transporting supplies to a distant place. Transport supplies to a distant place and the populace will be impoverished. Therefore a wise general strives to feed off the enemy. Each pound of food taken from the enemy is equivalent to twenty pounds you provide by yourself. Where there are big rewards there are valiant men. Change their
colors, use them mixed in with your own. Treat the soldiers well, take care of them. The important thing in a military operation is victory, not persistence. The general rule for use of the military is that it is better to keep a nation intact than to destroy it. It is better to keep an army
intact than to destroy it, better to keep a division intact than to destroy it, better to keep a battalion intact than to destroy it, better to keep a unit intact than to destroy it. If you make it clear what is to be rewarded and what punished, make your directives reliable, keep your machines in good repair, train and exercise your officers and troops, and let their strengths be known so as to overcome the opponent psychologically, this is considered very good. Therefore one who is good at martial arts overcomes others’ forces without battle, conquers others’ cities without siege, destroys others’ nations without taking a long time. If you are equal, then fight if you are able. If you are fewer, then keep away if you are able. If you are not as good, then flee if you are able. So there are three ways in which a civil leadership causes the military trouble. When a civil leadership
unaware of the facts tells its armies to advance when it should not or tells its armies to retreat when it should not, this is called tying up the armies. When the civil leadership is ignorant of military affairs but shares equally in the government of the armies, the soldiers get confused. When the civil leadership is ignorant of military maneuvers but shares equally in the command of the armies, the soldiers hesitate. Once the armies are confused and hesitant, trouble comes from competitors.
This is called taking away victory by deranging the military. WANG XI – To get rid of these problems, it is necessary to delegate unbridled authority, so it is imperative that officers who are to be generals be both loyal and talented. So there are five ways of knowing who
will win. Those who know when to fight and when not to fight are victorious. Those who discern when to use many or few troops are victorious. Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious. Those who face the unprepared with preparation are victorious. Those whose generals are able and are not constrained by their governments are victorious. These five are the ways to know who will win. JIA LIN – The movements of the armies must adapt to the situation on the spot—nothing causes more trouble than trying to run them from behind the lines. If you know others and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know others but know yourself, you win one and lose one; if you do not know others and do not know yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle. Invincibility is a matter of defense, vulnerability is a matter of attack. Those skilled in defense hide in the deepest depths of the earth, those skilled in attack maneuver in the highest heights of the sky. Therefore they can preserve themselves and achieve complete victory. Defense here means lying low when you do not see any effective way to attack, sinking into stillness and recondite silence, not letting opponents find you out. Attack is for when you see an advantage to aim for. On the attack you should be extremely swift, taking advantage of unexpectedness, wary of letting opponents find you out and prepare against
you. Everyone says victory in battle is good, but if you see the subtle and notice the hidden so as to seize victory where there is no form, this is really good. The
victories of good warriors are not noted for cleverness or bravery. Therefore their victories in battle are not flukes. Their victories are not flukes because they position themselves where they will surely win, prevailing over those who have already lost. Therefore a victorious army first wins and then seeks battle; a
defeated army first battles and then seeks victory. The rules of the military are five: measurement, assessment, calculation, comparison, and victory. The ground gives rise to measurements, measurements give rise to assessments, assessments give rise to calculations, calculations give rise to comparisons, comparisons give rise to
victories. When the victorious get their people to go to battle as if they were directing a massive flood of water into a deep canyon, this is a matter of formation. DU MU – When water accumulates in a deep canyon, no one can measure its amount, just as our defense shows no form. When the water is released it rushes down in a torrent, just as our attack is irresistible. When the speed of rushing water reaches the point where it can move boulders, this is the force of momentum. When the speed of a hawk is such that it can strike and kill, this is precision. So it is with skillful warriors—their force is swift, their precision is close. Their force is like drawing a catapult, their precision is like
releasing the trigger. When an army has the force of momentum, even the timid become brave; when it loses the force of momentum, even the brave become timid. Getting people to fight by letting the force of momentum work is like rolling logs and rocks. Logs and rocks are still when in a secure place, but roll on an incline; they remain stationary if square, they
roll if round. Therefore, when people are skillfully led into battle, the momentum is like that of round rocks rolling down a high mountain—this is force. Those who are first on the battlefield and await the opponents are at ease; those who are last on the battlefield and head into battle get worn out. Therefore good warriors cause others to come to them and do not go to others. If you make opponents come to fight, then their force will always be empty. If you do not go to fight, then your force will always be full. So when opponents are at ease, it is possible to tire them. When they are well fed, it is possible to starve them. When they are at rest, it is possible to move them. To advance irresistibly, push through their gaps. To retreat elusively, outspeed them. When you are on your home ground and are well supplied compared to the number of soldiers you have, while opponents are on
alien territory and have little food compared to their number, then it is to your advantage not to fight. If you want to be sure opponents will not dare come to do battle with you even though you are not heavily fortified, let them see a setup that confuses them and deflects their course. For example, when Sima Yi was going to attack Zhuge Liang, Zhuge took down his flags and put away his battle drums, opened the gates, and swept the road. Yi suspected an ambush, so he withdrew his forces and
fled. When you are concentrated into one while the opponent is divided into ten, you are attacking at a concentration of ten to one, so you outnumber the opponent. Your battleground is not to be known, for when it cannot be known, the enemy makes many guard outposts, and since multiple outposts are established, you only have to do battle with small
squads. So when the front is prepared, the rear is lacking, and when the rear is prepared the front is lacking. Preparedness on the left means lack on the right, preparedness on the right means lack on the left. Preparedness everywhere means lack everywhere. DU YOU – This means that when troops are on guard in many places, they are perforce scattered into small bands. Therefore victory in war is not repetitious but adapts its form endlessly. Military formation is like water—the form of water is to avoid the high and go to the low, the form of a military force is to avoid the full and attack the empty; the flow of water is determined by the earth, the victory of a military force is determined by the opponent. A military force has no constant formation, water has no constant shape: the ability to gain victory by changing and adapting according to the opponent is called genius. Struggling for an advantage fifty miles away will thwart the forward leadership, and as a rule, only fifty percent of the soldiers make it. Struggle for an advantage thirty miles away, and two out of three get there. So an army perishes if it has no equipment, it perishes if it has no food, and it perishes if it has no
money. Cymbals, drums, banners, and flags are used to focus and unify people’s ears and eyes. Once people are unified, the brave cannot proceed alone, the timid cannot retreat alone—this is the rule for employing a group. Therefore the rule for military operations is that if you can stir up the soldiers of all ranks with a common anger, then no one can stand up to them. Therefore, when opponents first come and their energy is keen, you break this down by not fighting with them for the time being. Watch for when they slump into boredom, then strike, and their keen energy can be taken away. Using order to deal with the disorderly, using calm to deal with the clamorous, is mastering the heart. Do not stop an army on its way home. If you can change with the momentum of forces, then the advantage does not change, so the only ones who get hurt are others. Therefore there is no constant structure. If you can fully comprehend this principle, you can get people to work. Therefore
there are five traits that are dangerous in generals: Those who are ready to die can be killed; those who are intent on living can be captured; those who are quick to anger can be shamed; those who are puritanical can be disgraced; those who love people can be troubled. Good generals are otherwise: they are not committed to death yet do not expect to live; they act in accord with events, not quick to anger, not subject to embarrassment. When they see possibility, they are like tigers, otherwise, they shut their doors. Their action and inaction are matters of strategy, and they cannot be pleased or angered.
Note: Engage when you have the momentum. Those whose words are humble while they increase war preparations are going to advance. Those whose words are strong and who advance aggressively are going to retreat. JIA LIN – A large group striking a small group is not held in high esteem;
what is held in high esteem is when a small group can strike a large group. If soldiers are punished before a personal attachment to the leadership is formed, they will not submit, and if they do not submit they are hard to employ. One advances without seeking glory, retreats without avoiding blame, only protecting people, to the benefit of the government as well, thus rendering valuable service to the nation. Look upon your soldiers as beloved children, and they willingly die with you. If you are so nice to them that you cannot employ them, so kind to them that you cannot command them, so casual with them that you cannot establish order, they are like spoiled children, useless. According to the rule for military operations, there are nine kinds of ground. The condition of a military force is that its essential factor is speed, taking advantage of others’ failure to catch up, going by routes they do not expect, attacking where they are not on guard. So a skillful military
operation should be like a swift snake that counters with its tail when someone strikes at its head, counters with its head when someone strikes at its tail, and counters with both head and tail when someone strikes at its middle. Therefore those skilled in military operations achieve cooperation in a group so that directing the group is like directing a single individual with no other choice. The business of the general is quiet and secret, fair and orderly. He can keep the soldiers unaware,
make them ignorant. When a leader establishes a goal with the troops, he is like one who climbs up to a high place and then tosses away the ladder. When a leader enters deeply into enemy territory with the troops, he brings out their potential. He has them burn the boats and destroy the pots, drives them like sheep, none knowing where they are going. Employ the entire armed forces like employing a single person. Employ them with actual tasks, do not talk to them. Motivate them with benefits, do not tell them about harm. A
major military operation is a severe drain on the nation and may be kept up for years in the struggle for one day’s victory. So to fail to know the conditions of opponents because of reluctance to give rewards for intelligence is extremely inhumane, uncharacteristic of a true military leader, uncharacteristic of an assistant of the government, uncharacteristic of a victorious chief. So what enables an intelligent government and a wise military leadership to overcome others and achieve
extraordinary accomplishments is foreknowledge. Last Updated on July 15, 2020 by What is the main message of The Art of War?The main idea of "The Art of War" is, "He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
Why is The Art of War so important?The Art of War has remained relevant over the years because it is about strategy and tactics rather than specific warfare technology. It has influenced leaders all over the world, not only in warfare but in many areas of life, including business.
Is art of war worth reading?Unlike most of the 'classics', this is one that can be read in less than half an hour, it's a quick and easy piece to tick off the list and can easily fit in your bag for a quick journey read. But don't let the flimsy size fool you, this book is a powerful monograph.
What age is appropriate to read art of war?It's recommended for kids 6 years old and older. The editorial supervisor, Takashi Saito, is a professor at Meiji University and an expert on education; he's also one of Japan's most beloved authors.
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